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YOU CAN’T SAY THAT!: PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE AND
VIEWPOINT DISCRIMINATION IN THE SOCIAL MEDIA ERA
Micah Telegen*

ABSTRACT
The growing prevalence of privately-owned social media platforms is changing
the way Americans and their governments communicate. This shift offers new
opportunities, but also requires a reinterpretation of the First Amendment’s
proscription of government limitations of speech. The public forum doctrine and
its proscription of viewpoint discrimination seem particularly stretched by the
digital revolution and the development of social media. In ongoing cases, litigants
and courts have invoked the doctrine to limit the government’s ability to ‘block’
those who comment critically on government pages—much to the chagrin of those
who note the private status of the companies hosting the pages and easy workarounds to ‘blocks.’
This Note argues that, given recent Supreme Court expansion of the concept of
viewpoint discrimination, courts may be stretching the doctrine too far. These
decisions call into question the constitutionality of government use of platforms
that incorporate viewpoint discriminatory rules—such as hate speech bans—into
their terms of service.
This Note concludes by proposing a solution: returning to the roots of the
public forum doctrine. It argues that the question undergirding public forum
analysis should be whether speech is consistent with the maintenance of the forum
in which it occurs. If speech can occur without preventing the regular use of a
forum, government regulation should be prohibited. If not, the government can—
and should—take reasonable steps to maintain the forum for use by all.
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INTRODUCTION
The 2016 election cycle made it clear that social media plays a
prominent role in the American psyche. At some point, we may
experience another digital revolution; until then, the privately1
owned social media platform is here to stay.
Nowhere is this demonstrated more clearly than in the sphere of
government and politics. True, White House briefings, long the
vehicle by which the federal government spoke to the people, con2
tinue. But, some of President Donald J. Trump’s most memorable
3
statements have been made via his two Twitter accounts. These accounts, @realDonaldTrump and @POTUS, reach more than 55.7
4
and 24.5 million ‘followers,’ respectively. The Department of Jus-

1. See Mike Isaac & Sydney Ember, For Election Day Influence, Twitter Ruled Social Media,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/09/technology/for-electionday-chatter-twitter-ruled-social-media.html.
2. See Callum Borchers, 10 Memorable White House Press Briefing Moments of 2017, WASH.
POST: THE FIX (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2017/
12/27/10-memorable-white-house-press-briefing-moments-of-2017/?utm_term=
.9e78801c7265.
3. See Donald Trump’s Noteworthy Tweets as President, NEWSDAY (Nov. 30, 2017, 5:40 PM),
https://www.newsday.com/news/nation/donald-trump-s-noteworthy-tweets-as-president-1.
12632966.
4. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump (last visited Oct. 26, 2018); President Trump (@POTUS), TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/POTUS (last visited Nov. 16, 2018). Numbers are approximate and are
accurate as of November 16, 2018. To provide some context for these numbers: presumably,
there is some overlap between followers of the two pages. Additionally, some percentage of
these ‘followers’ are institutional accounts, multiple accounts run by the same individual,
and fake accounts. Numerous reports suggest that many of President Trump’s ‘followers’
are fake accounts, or ‘bots.’ See, e.g., Ryan Bort, Nearly Half of Donald Trump’s Twitter Followers
Are Fake Accounts and Bots, NEWSWEEK (May 30, 2017, 4:43 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/
donald-trump-twitter-followers-fake-617873. Finally, there is no requirement that followers
on any platform be American citizens.
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tice has made it clear that President Trump’s tweets are official
5
6
statements. The White House has said the same.
In recent months, President Trump’s decision to block a num7
ber of critics from his Twitter page has drawn significant attention.
It has also sparked a wave of litigation—brought by the ACLU, the
Knight Institute, and like-minded organizations—aimed at President Trump and other government officials engaged in similar be8
havior. In the highest-profile case decided to date, the Southern
District Court of New York ruled that President Trump’s use of
Twitter’s
blocking
feature—in
connection
with
his
@realDonaldTrump account—violated blocked individuals’ First
9
Amendment rights. Regardless of how similar cases are decided,
the problems with government presence on privately-owned social
media pages run even deeper than the blocking phenomenon.
Lower courts’ interpretations of recent Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the public forum doctrine and related First
Amendment concepts are leading us down a dangerous path. Under these new interpretations, the doctrine cannot be reconciled
with the reality that government actors rely on privately-owned
10
platforms to engage with the public.

5. See Lorelai Laird, DOJ Says Trump’s Tweets are Official Presidential Statements,
ABAJOURNAL (Nov. 14, 2017, 2:49 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/
government_says_trumps_tweets_are_official_presidential_statements.
6. See Elizabeth Landers, White House: Trump’s Tweets are ‘Official Statements’, CNN (June
16, 2017, 4:37 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/06/politics/trump-tweets-officialstatements/index.html.
7. See Issie Lapowsky & Louise Matsakis, Trump Can’t Block Critics on Twitter. What This
Means for You, WIRED (May 23, 2018, 6:29 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/donaldtrump-blocking-on-twitter-unconstitutional/. “Blocking” refers to a number of mechanisms,
used by most prominent social media sites, that allow a user to prevent another user from
interacting with their page. Depending on the site, the “blocked” user will either not be able
to see the first user’s page or will be prohibited from commenting on it. Similar features
generally present allow users to delete individuals’ messages from their page, or to hide
them from view of other users.
8. See Knight Institute v. Trump – Lawsuit Challenging President Trump’s Blocking of Critics
on Twitter, KNIGHT INST. (updated Dec. 1, 2017), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/
knight-institute-v-trump-lawsuit-challenging-president-trumps-blocking-critics-twitter; ACLU
of Maine Sues LePage Over Facebook Censorship, ACLU (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.aclu.org/
news/aclu-maine-sues-lepage-over-facebook-censorship. In one of the most advanced suits to
date, a federal court in Virginia held that a local official had violated a constituent’s First
Amendment rights by blocking him on Facebook. See Mark Joseph Stern, Federal Court: Public
Officials Cannot Block Social Media Users Because of Their Criticism, SLATE: FUTURE TENSE (July
28, 2017, 2:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2017/07/28/federal_court_
rules_public_officials_cannot_block_social_media_users.html. The decision is discussed extensively in Part I infra.
9. Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-1691 (2d Cir. June 5, 2018).
10. See Social Media Usage within Local Government, PUB. TECH. INST., http://www.pti.org/
news/displaynews.asp?NewsID=280&TargetID=3 (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) [hereinafter
PUB. TECH. INST.] (documenting the degree to which local government makes use of social
media).
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Part I of this Note provides a brief primer on the public forum
doctrine as it stands and explains how courts have applied it to social media in the wake of Packingham, Matal, Davison, and other recent First Amendment cases. Part II explains the problem: it argues
that the public forum doctrine in its current state cannot effectively be applied to private networks that lack an alternative platform.
It also addresses the ramifications of applying the public forum
doctrine and concurrently deeming bans on offensive speech to be
viewpoint discrimination. Part III acknowledges the most troubling
implications of this conclusion and then offers a solution. How do
we reconcile the government’s need to use social media platforms
for communication with our desire to enjoy First Amendment protections in the digital space? Perhaps the answer can be found in a
return to the intuition at the roots of the public forum doctrine:
the notion that speech within forums should be allowed so long as
it is consistent with the forum’s operation.
PART I: THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE IS AT A CROSSROADS
In the wake of the decisions discussed below, government entities may begin devoting their energies to curating their online
presence so as to avoid viewpoint-discrimination. Still, based on the
facts presented in Davison—a case where a government-operated
social media page was found to be a public forum—and similar litigation around the country, it seems likely that government entities
will continue to engage in practices that are conceivably at odds
11
with the doctrine.
A. The Basics of the Public Forum Doctrine Analysis
The public forum doctrine—a doctrine which prescribes rules
limiting the government’s ability to regulate speech in areas creat12
ed for the purpose of speech —devotes significant attention to
13
evaluating what ‘type’ of forum has been created. And while
14
“viewpoint discrimination is prohibited in all forums,” rendering
11. See, e.g., Davison v. Loudon Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702 (E.D. Va.
2017) (appeal pending).
12. The point of the public forum doctrine is to weigh our desire to protect public
speech against the need of the government to function.
13. See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802–03
(1985).
14. Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d 1062,
1067 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006). Viewpoint discrimination is a rule that suggests different outcomes
for speech on the basis of the view expressed.
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this analysis less important for evaluating the constitutionality of
hate speech bans, it may be helpful to provide a brief outline of the
types of forum envisioned by the doctrine. In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, the Supreme Court laid out
three basic types of forums: the traditional public forum, the des15
ignated public forum, and the nonpublic or closed forum. The
Court also acknowledged the possibility of a ‘limited public forum’—a type of designated public forum opened only for certain
16
classes or types of speech.
First, the Court identified “public forums” as places which “by
long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assem17
bly or debate.” Streets and parks are typical examples of this type
18
of ‘traditional public forum.’ In these forums, “the rights of the
19
state to limit expressive activity are sharply circumscribed.” Even
content-based restrictions (as opposed to viewpoint-based) are sub20
ject to strict scrutiny. Content-neutral restrictions are permissible,
21
but they are subject to a similar analysis.
The Court also identified a category of “public property which
the state has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive
22
activity.” Typical examples of this category include university
23
meeting facilities, school board meetings, and municipal theaters.
While these ‘designated public forums’ may not be traditional public forums, they are treated as such for the duration of their exist24
ence—that is, for as long as they are used as public forums. The

15. Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 45–46 (1983) (This
case involved a dispute over access by rival unions to teacher mailboxes and an inter-school
mailing system); see also Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2009).
16. See Perry Educ. Ass’n 460 U.S. at 46 n.7, 47 (“A public forum may be created for a
limited purpose such as use by certain groups for the discussion of certain subjects.”); see also
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) (offering an
example of the Court analyzing a limited public forum).
17. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
18. Id.
19. Id.; see also, e.g., Bible Believers v. Wayne Cty., Michigan, 805 F. 3d. 228, 246–47 (6th
Cir. 2015 (quoting Perry and applying the standard).
20. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45; see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S.
622, 641 (1994) (describing how content discrimination triggers strict scrutiny because it
“poses the inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory
goal, but to suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate
through coercion rather than persuasion.”).
21. See Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
22. Id. at 45–46; see also, e.g., Keister v. Bell, 879 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing
Perry and acknowledging the standard).
23. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 45.
24. Id. at 46; see also G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U.
ILL. L. REV. 949, 958 (1991) (acknowledging the consequences of the doctrine).
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government’s ability to limit speech here is subject to the same re25
strictions as in traditional forums.
The Court also acknowledged an argument from a group of
teachers that the inter-school mailing system (at issue in Perry Education Association) was a “limited public forum” from which they
26
could not be excluded. As the Court explained in a later opinion,
“[w]hen the State establishes a limited public forum, [it] is not re27
quired to . . . allow persons to engage in every type of speech.”
Still, limitations on speech in these forums may not be viewpoint28
based.
The Court contrasted these public forums with nonpublic forums: government-owned property opened for a particular pur29
pose not involving speech. In these forums, “distinctions in access
on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity,” impermissible
30
in public forums, are generally allowed. Viewpoint discrimination
31
remains impermissible. An example of a nonpublic forum is a
32
mailbox.
It should be noted that some types of public property or services
are excluded from this category and, for one reason or another,
33
are not subject to forum analysis. Network television channels are
an example of such a property where, communicative nature notwithstanding, no forum exists—and therefore the doctrine does
34
not apply.
B. Applying the Public Forum Doctrine to the Digital Age
Even before the wave of “blocking” litigation that commenced in
2016 (described supra Introduction), there was some doctrinal
support for the notion that a government-run, online, interactive
25. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 46; Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee,
505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992).
26. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 47.
27. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. School, 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001); see also Barrett v.
Walker Cty. School Dist., 872 F.3d. 1209, 1225 (citing Good News Club and applying the rule
to a school board meeting).
28. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106; see also, e.g., Gerlich v. Leath, 861 F.3d. 697, 715
(8th Cir. 2017) (citing Good News Club and finding impermissible viewpoint discrimination).
29. Perry Educ. Ass’n, 460 U.S. at 49.
30. Id.
31. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
The distinction between subject-matter restrictions and viewpoint-discrimination can be
blurry. By way of example, limiting the subject covered in a forum to a specific proposal
would be a subject-matter restriction. Excluding those who oppose the proposal would be
viewpoint-discrimination.
32. See id. at 132.
33. See Muir v. Alabama Educ. Television Comm’n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1043 (5th Cir. 1982).
34. Id.
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forum might be, at the very least, a limited public forum. In Page v.
Lexington County School District One, the Fourth Circuit held that a
school website did not become a limited public forum (and thus its
operators were not limited by the constraints of the public forum
35
doctrine) by linking to external sites. In making its decision, the
court leaned heavily on the school district’s exclusive control over
36
the content of the page. The court also posited that, had some
facet of the site “transformed [it] into a type of ‘chat room’ or ‘bulletin board’ in which private viewers could express opinions or
37
post information, the issue would, of course, be different.” The
court’s implication is that enabling the public to ‘post’ or modify
the content of a webpage would suggest the creation of some sort
38
of forum.
In a 2017 case about access to social media, Justice Kennedy
39
equated social media to the modern town square. In Packingham,
the Court unanimously invalidated a North Carolina statute that
prohibited registered sex offenders from accessing social network40
ing sites used by minors. Justice Kennedy wrote at length about
the importance of social media in modern discourse: “Today, one
of the most important places to exchange views is cyberspace, particularly social media, which offers ‘relatively unlimited, low-cost
41
capacity for communication of all kinds.’” Justice Kennedy went
42
on to call social media “the modern public square.” Justice Alito,
in his concurrence, complained that the Court’s “undisciplined
dicta” consisted of “musings that seem to equate the entirety of the
43
internet with public streets and parks.” Still, it seems likely, espe44
cially given his opinion in Matal, discussed below, that Justice
Alito’s disagreement with the majority’s language was motivated
45
largely by the specter of pedophiles preying on adolescents.

35. See 531 F.3d 275, 285 (4th Cir. 2008).
36. See id. The court noted that the district controlled the website and its content.
37. Id.
38. See id. at 284.
39. Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017). Justice Gorsuch did
not hear the case.
40. Id. at 1731.
41. Id. at 1732. And Justice Kennedy was not the first person to pick up on this aspect of
the digital revolution. See e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 881 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (Dalzell,
J., supporting) (“It is no exaggeration to conclude that the Internet has achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory marketplace of mass speech that this country–and
indeed the world–has yet seen.”), aff’d, 521 U.S. 844, 852 (1997).
42. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 1737.
43. Id. at 1738 (Alito, J., concurring).
44. Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017).
45. Packingham, 137 S. Ct. at 173 (Alito, J., concurring) (“[T]his language is bound to
be interpreted by some to mean that the States are largely powerless to restrict even the
most dangerous sexual predators from visiting any internet sites, including, for example,
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Packingham also suggested that social media technology might be
moving too quickly for the Court to keep up. 46 This raises the possibility that the Court might decline to lay down any clear jurisprudence on the matter for fear of wasted efforts caused by changes in
the landscape. As Justice Kennedy explained, “[t]he Internet’s
forces and directions are so new, so protean, and so far reaching
that courts must be conscious that what they say today may be ob47
solete tomorrow.”
In Matal v. Tam, a First Amendment challenge to a Trademark
Office determination, Justice Alito—speaking for four members of
the Court and announcing its decision—made it clear that ‘hate
48
speech’ is a viewpoint. And while Justice Kennedy (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) wrote a separate opinion to
address the possibility of some government speech contexts where
the viewpoint discrimination rule might not apply, he agreed that
that rules “reflect[ing] the Government’s disapproval of a subset of
messages it finds offensive . . . . [are] the essence of viewpoint dis49
crimination.” The respondent was the Asian-American leader of a
band who had applied for a trademark for their name: “The
50
Slants.” After the Patent and Trademark Office rejected the application as offensive, The Slants successfully appealed the decision
51
to the Federal Circuit. The government then petitioned for certi52
orari. Affirming the Circuit’s decision, Justice Alito explained
that, in this context, ‘viewpoint discrimination’ is used in a broad
53
sense. It mattered little that the “clause evenhandedly prohib54
it[ed] disparagement of all groups.” “Giving offense,” Justice Alito
55
concluded, “is a viewpoint.”

teenage dating sites and sites designed to permit minors to discuss personal problems with
their peers.”).
46. See id. at 1736.
47. Id. Justice Kennedy seems to see this as militating for an approach that favors protections for speech. “[T]he Court must exercise extreme caution before suggesting that the
First Amendment provides scant protection for access to vast networks in that medium.” Id.
48. 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017). All eight members of the Court who heard the case
agreed that the relevant regulation was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. See id.
Merriam-Webster defines hate speech as “speech expressing hatred of a particular group of
people.” Hate Speech, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
hate%20speech (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
49. Id. at 1766. Justice Kennedy also explicitly rejected an argument that the statute in
question was viewpoint neutral because it applied in equal measure to any offending or demeaning material covered. See id.
50. In this context, ‘Slants’ is a derogatory term for those of Asian descent.
51. Id. at 1754.
52. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Lee v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2016) (No. 15-1293),
2016 WL 1593780.
53. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763.
54. See id.
55. Id.
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Matal is particularly relevant for cases involving government action on social media. In Davison v. Loudoun County Board of Supervisors, a federal court in Virginia held that a local official, Randall,
had violated a constituent’s First Amendment rights by blocking
56
the constituent from Randall’s government social media page.
Judge Cacheris’ opinion in this Section 1983 suit provides a
framework for how judges might navigate similar situations going
forward.
Judge Cacheris first concluded that Randall acted under the
color of state law in creating and operating her “Chair Phyllis J.
57
Randall” Facebook page. This ruling was necessary to find the
constitutional violation required in a Section 1983 claim. The
court listed more than ten factors in reaching this conclusion, including that Randall was “an elected official who answers only to
her constituents” and that “[n]o [county] policy . . . played any
58
role in [Randall’s] decision to ban [the plaintiff].” The court
summarized that the page “arose out of public, not personal, circumstances,” and that Randall had used it as a “tool of govern59
ance.”
Next, Judge Cacheris concluded that the constituent’s First
60
Amendment rights had been violated. The court first examined
61
whether the blocked post was constitutionally protected. The
court concluded it was, as the comment that drew Randall’s ire was
62
a critique of her official conduct.
The court proceeded to evaluate whether the creation of the Fa63
cebook page had opened a forum for speech. Citing Page, the
court opined that this was just the sort of “‘chat room’ or ‘bulletin
64
board’” that the Fourth Circuit had in mind. The court explained
that “[w]hen one creates a Facebook page, one generally opens a

56. See Davison v. Loudon Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 702 (E.D. Va.
2017), appeal docketed, Davison v. Randall, No. 17-2002 (4th Cir. Aug. 29, 2017). Note that the
appeal has generated a number of amicus briefs.
57. Id. at 711.
58. See id. at 714, 719.
59. Id. at 713. This seems to be an application of the analysis in an earlier 4th Circuit
First Amendment case which reversed a ruling below holding that sheriff’s deputies who
drove around on the eve of Election Day, removing from circulation newspapers that they
suspected would be critical of the sheriff, were not acting under color of state law. See Rossignol v. Voorharr, 316 F.3d 516, 519 (4th Cir. 2003).
60. Id. at 714.
61. See id. at 717.
62. Id. The plaintiff, after confronting the defendant at a public meeting, had accused
her colleagues in county government of corruption.
63. See id. at 716.
64. Id.
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digital space for the exchange of ideas and information.” 65 The
court also suggested that the fact Randall had affirmatively asked
her constituents to weigh in with their thoughts indicated the crea66
tion of a forum.
The type of forum Randall created with her page is unclear, as
67
the court declined to reach a ruling on this matter. It explained
that this was unnecessary in light of its determination that Randall
engaged in viewpoint discrimination, which is prohibited in all fo68
rums. The court cited Matal’s “giving offense is a viewpoint” language and pointed to a portion of Randall’s testimony stating that
69
she found the constituent’s accusations “slanderous.” The court
then deemed the constituent’s comment to be just the sort of offensive speech which Matal suggested could not be restricted and
found that Randall had committed a “cardinal sin under the First
70
Amendment.”
Confusingly, the court then attempted to retreat across some of
the jurisprudential ground it had just covered by questioning the
reach of its holding. It cautioned that “a degree of moderation is
necessary to preserve social media websites as useful forums for the
71
exchange of ideas.” It then suggested that “[n]eutral . . . social
media policies . . . may provide vital guidance” in avoiding a First
72
Amendment disaster. This is confusing because Matal seems to
eliminate the possibility that such a policy, at least to the extent it
proscribes certain sentiments, could be both effective and constitutionally sound: if hate speech is a viewpoint, then even broad limitations on all hate speech are viewpoint discriminatory and there73
fore unacceptable under the First Amendment.
In a recently-decided case, the Southern District of New York
used similar logic to find that President Trump, and his social media director, could not block respondents on his
@realDonaldTrump Twitter account without violating their First
74
Amendment rights. While the basic logic is similar to Davison, the
case is noteworthy for two reasons: first, because of the public offi-

65. Id. To support this proposition, the court cited Justice Kennedy’s Packingham dicta.
Id. Whatever else is true of Justice Alito’s concurrence in Packingham, this citation seems to
suggest that he was correct in suggesting that Justice Kennedy opened a big door.
66. See id.
67. See id. at 716–17.
68. Id.
69. See id. at 717.
70. Id. at 718.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017).
74. Knight First Amendment Inst. v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal docketed, No. 18-1691 (2d Cir. June 5, 2018). The case is currently being appealed.
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cial in question; and second, because the court attempts to apply
the public forum doctrine to the confusing mechanics of a Twitter
75
thread.
While the limiting dicta in Davison suggests that government entities should be able to create social media policies that avoid violating the First Amendment, the jurisprudential problems are
deeper than they might appear at first glance. If courts continue to
deploy Packingham and Matal to prohibit viewpoint discrimination
76
on government-controlled social media pages, blocking unruly
individuals may be the least of the government’s worries. The government may find all use of private social media under attack.
PART II: THE DOCTRINE IS DOOMED
The open-ended nature of Justice Kennedy’s remarks in Packingham brought the question of how to characterize social media
profiles within the public forum framework, and the appropriate
indicia to use in such an analysis, to the forefront. 77 But so long as
Justice Kennedy’s remarks are understood to support the proposition that at least some government social media profiles are public
78
forums, then the government’s continued presence on social media is under threat.
If the government may not discriminate based on viewpoint
79
against individuals once they have ‘spoken’, it stands to reason
that the government may not preemptively do the same before
80
they have spoken. By choosing to host these pages on private plat-

75. See id. at *42 (attempting to identify the actual forum in question in the context of a
Tweet and the threads that emerge from it). Twitter’s “muting” function also led to some
confusion. See id. at *8–9.
76. And at least some commentators believe it will. See First Amendment—Freedom of
Speech—Public Forum Doctrine—Packingham v. North Carolina, 131 HARV. L. REV. 233, 238
(“[T]he Court’s rhetoric furthered a nascent theory expounded in recent litigation . . . that
government-administered Facebook pages and Twitter timelines constitute public fora.”)
[hereinafter Packingham Casenote].
77. See Davison, 267 F. Supp. 3d at 718; Packingham Casenote, supra note 76, at 233
(“Packingham’s . . . framing of the internet as a public space . . . opened a Pandora’s box,
with repercussions for certain First Amendment precepts . . . . [T]he Court’s public space
rhetoric implied that the public forum doctrine might be pliable enough to encompass the
internet and social media[.]”).
78. See, e.g., Packingham Casenote, supra note 75 (repeatedly citing and quoting Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017), to reach this conclusion).
79. See id.
80. Such action resembles a prior restraint on speech. Prior restraints tend to be found
when there is “an administrative system . . . that prevents speech from occurring.” ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.2.3 (5th ed. 2015).
There is a strong presumption against the constitutionality of such measures. See Nebraska
Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) ([P]rior restraints on speech . . . are the most
serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights.”).
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forms which include viewpoint discriminatory language in their
81
terms of service agreements (e.g., bans on hate speech), the government is doing just that. These service agreements present significant doctrinal difficulties and policy problems. Public forum
doctrine as currently articulated effectively demands that the government abandon social media altogether to avoid a First Amendment violation or limit its presence in some significant but inde82
terminate way. This is an impossible choice which demands a
revision of the doctrine.
A. Government won’t be leaving social media any time soon . . .
Given the popularity of social media in America, it seems likely
that the government is on social media to stay. A recent study
83
found that seven out of ten Americans use social media. About
seventy five percent of Facebook users and fifty percent of Insta84
gram users visit these sites at least once a day. And while Facebook is far-and-away the most popular platform, Pinterest, Instagram, LinkedIn, and Twitter each have millions of users in the
85
United States. And where Americans go, their government will
follow. From President Donald J. Trump to the Ann Arbor Police
Department, government officials and departments have raced to
86
establish a presence online. As of November 2018, President
Trump reaches more than eighty million followers through his two
Twitter accounts, to say nothing of those he reaches on other plat87
forms. But it’s not just President Trump. An early 2017 survey
conducted by the Public Technology Institute found that eightyfive percent of local government agencies have some sort of social
88
media presence. New York City’s municipal government utilized
348 social media channels on at least ten platforms as of November

81. See, e.g., Hateful Conduct Policy, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-andpolicies/hateful-conduct-policy (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (banning speech that “directly
attack[s] . . . other people on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation,
gender, gender identity, religious affiliation, age, disability, or serious disease.”).
82. See Part B infra.
83. Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.
org/fact-sheet/social-media/ [hereinafter PEW RESEARCH CTR.].
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See, e.g., City of Ann Arbor - Police Department, FACEBOOK, https://
www.facebook.com/annarborpolice/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2018); President Trump
(@POTUS), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/potus?lang=en (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
87. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/realDonald
Trump/memberships?lang=en (last visited Nov. 16, 2018); President Trump, supra note 86.
These numbers should be viewed with the caveats offered in note 4, supra, in mind.
88. PUB. TECH. INST., supra note 10.
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2018, 89 and a Twitter account set up by NASA for the sole purpose
of providing updates from the Curiosity Rover has more than 3.9
90
million followers. Indeed, social media presence has become such
a ubiquitous element of government operations and strategy that
91
an entire industry has sprung up to service needs in that space.
Social media presence has become a critical part of government
officials’ communications efforts. A 2015 study surveying congressional staffers found that seventy-six percent of respondents believed social media “enable[s] us to have more meaningful interac92
tions with constituents.” Local and state governments have found
93
numerous uses for social media. Government officials rely on social media not only to spread their message but also as a vehicle to
94
allow for constituent input and two-way communication. Accepting constituent input via social media enables government officials
95
and agencies to appear receptive and responsive to constituents.
But, the government’s use of social media is not limited to facilitating constituent input, though. As early as 2011, federal and state
agencies recognized social media’s potential as a tool for coordinating and targeting emergency services, both routine and during
96
disasters. Indeed, federal laws call for the Department of Homeland Security to develop a robust presence on social media for
97
such purposes. This emergency response use of social media was
critical to coordination efforts during the 2017 hurricane season,

89. See Social Media, NYC.GOV, http://www1.nyc.gov/connect/social-media.page (last
visited Nov. 16, 2018).
90. Curiosity Rover (@MarsCuriosity), TWITTER, https://twitter.com/MarsCuriosity
(last visited Nov. 16, 2018).
91. See GSMCON GOVERNMENT SOCIAL MEDIA CONFERENCE, http://gsmcon.com/
agenda (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (outlining the agenda for an upcoming industry conference).
92. New Report Outlines How Congress and Citizens Interact on Social Media, CONG. MGMT.
FOUND. (Oct. 14, 2015) http://www.congressfoundation.org/news/press-releases/1123-newreport-outlines-how-congress-and-citizens-interact-on-social-media
[hereinafter
CONG.
MGMT. FOUND.].
93. See, e.g., How a Local Government Team of 30+ Serves 1.1 Million Constituents on Social
Media, HootSuite, https://hootsuite.com/resources/case-study/the-six-steps-fairfax-countygovernment-took-to-scale-social-media-across-departments (last visited Oct. 26, 2018) (documenting the numerous ways Fairfax County utilizes social media).
94. Id.
95. See Ross Rinehart, Note, “Friending” and “Following” the Government: How the Public
Forum and Government Speech Doctrines Discourage the Government’s Social Media Presence, 22 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 781, 831–32 (2013) (summarizing expert research on the subject).
96. See Understanding the Power of Social Media as a Communication Tool in the Aftermath of
Disasters: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Disaster Recovery and Intergovernmental Affairs of the S.
Comm. on Homeland Sec., 112th Cong. (2011) (written statement of Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency) (“[S]ocial media is extremely valuable to the
work we do.”).
97. DHS Social Media Improvement Act of 2015, 6 U.S.C.A. § 195d (West 2018).

248

University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform

[Vol. 52:1

when a series of storms battered Texas, Florida, and the Caribbe98
an.
None of these social-media uses are problematic on their own.
But a closer examination of the terms of service and other limitations on speech that most major social media platforms employ
suggests that viewpoint discrimination occurs long before the first
official clicks “block.” Facebook prohibits, among other things,
99
100
“hate speech.” Instagram bars content that is “hateful.” Twitter
bans “hateful conduct,” a category of content including speech
that “directly attack[s] . . . other people on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity,
101
religious affiliation, age, disability, or serious disease.” Twitter has
also acknowledged that it considers the “newsworthiness” of a post
when evaluating whether it violates content rules and should be
102
removed. Even if every other restriction the platforms use is
deemed acceptable, it seems post-Matal that these hate speech
103
bans are viewpoint discriminatory. As Justice Alito explained in
Matal, “giving offense is a viewpoint” that cannot be restrained,
even by rules that “evenhandedly prohibit[ed] disparagement of
104
all groups.”
Consequently, any time a government page is found to be a public forum, and is therefore subject to the prohibition on viewpoint
discrimination, the government automatically and impermissibly
limits citizens’ ability to speak in the first instance based on their
viewpoint. This is either direct government discrimination—by
choice of a viewpoint discriminatory forum—or, at best, censorship
by proxy—if the specific violation is the platform’s removal of the
105
offending content from the government-created public forum.

98. See Brian Stelter, How Social Media is Helping Houston Deal with Harvey Floods, CNN
(Aug. 28, 2017, 12:21 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/08/28/media/harvey-rescuessocial-media-facebook-twitter/index.html (outlining the use of social media to coordinate
rescue and recovery efforts during Hurricane Harvey).
99. Community Standards III.12: Hate Speech, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
communitystandards/objectionable_content (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
100. Community Guidelines, INSTAGRAM, https://help.instagram.com/477434105621119/
?helpref=hc_fnav&bc[0]=368390626577968&bc[1]=285881641526716 (last visited Oct. 26,
2018).
101. Hateful Conduct Policy, TWITTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/
hateful-conduct-policy (last visited Oct. 26, 2018).
102. Catherine Shu, Twitter Says It Hasn’t Deleted Trump’s Provocative North Korea Tweet Because of “Newsworthiness”, TECHCRUNCH (Sep. 27, 2017) https://techcrunch.com/2017/
09/25/twitter-says-it-hasnt-deleted-trumps-provocative-north-korea-tweet-because-of-news
worthiness/.
103. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017).
104. Id.
105. While the Communications Decency Act of 1996 explicitly protects “Good Samaritan” blocking and screening of objectionable material from civil liability regardless of constitutional status, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012), this would not be implicated in a constitutional
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Some might suggest that, despite their viewpoint discriminatory
nature, these bans are acceptable because those blocked have ac106
cess to other forums. Those blocked could, for example, express
their views in a letter, or at a protest. But even assuming that there
107
is a replacement forum equivalent to posting on Twitter, this argument falls short. The public forum doctrine strongly suggests
that the government cannot get away with viewpoint discrimination
108
by pointing to a hypothetical alternative forum.
While there is limited precedent regarding public forums created on privately-owned digital platforms, one pre-digital analogy
may be useful for thinking about the relevance of platformownership: a town meeting hosted by a local official at a private
109
venue. It is plausible that the private location of an event might
inform the analysis of whether the public forum doctrine should
apply—perhaps suggesting that the official is not holding the event
in her public capacity—or inform the analysis evaluating the type
of forum—suggesting that the forum is, if anything, limited in na110
ture. However, to the extent that the government creates a public forum on privately-held property, it seems unlikely that the
property’s owner would be able to effectively grant the ability to
trample on the rights of those using the forum to the govern111
ment. After all, the government cannot free itself of the constraints of the Establishment Clause by proselytizing on private

claim regarding the government’s use of such a webpage. It would be a funny thing if Congress could pass laws explicitly abrogating the Constitution.
106. See, e.g., Thomas Wheatley, Why Social Media is Not a Public Forum, WASH. POST: ALL
OPINIONS ARE LOCAL (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/all-opinionsare-local/wp/2017/08/04/why-social-media-is-not-a-public-forum/?utm_term=
.30845de8feb0 (arguing that social media pages are not public forums in part because affected constituents may post “essentially the same thing on multiple pages”). Wheatley also
notes in passing the potential consequences of this ruling for government presence on social media moving forward, before summarily dismissing it as an unacceptable outcome that
would be “unfair” to social media platforms. Maybe so, but I am unsure of the doctrinal significance of the outcome’s unfairness.
107. This is another situation where the unusual character of social media makes for
imperfect comparisons. One could imagine a compelling argument that social media offers
wider exposure and more effective dissemination of views for users commenting on government pages. It might then be argued that no in-person protest or letter to an official can
provide the user a comparable opportunity to speak. This is an interesting question, but not
one that needs to be answered here given the doctrine laid out above.
108. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 519 U.S. 819, 829 (1995);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, § 11.4.2 (“Viewpoint restrictions of speech are virtually never
allowed.”).
109. Wheatley envisions a similar scenario, though his is a private event on private property open to the public. Wheatley, supra note 106.
110. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
111. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 548, 552 (1975) (finding a violation of the First Amendment where plaintiff was denied the right to use a privately-owned theatre leased by the government).
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property. 112 By holding a public forum with viewpoint discriminatory rules in place, the government would be violating the First
113
Amendment rights of those muzzled. The practical consequences
of building such a loophole into the public forum doctrine would
be disastrous: public meetings about controversial topics could easily find their way to private venues operated by those in simpatico
114
with the government.
It is worth drawing a distinction between individual government
officials and government agencies, if only to highlight why the distinction does not change the outcome. A city’s fire department
and an alderman holding public meetings might or might not be
treated differently for purposes of determining whether they are in
115
fact acting in a government capacity. It might be more likely that
an individual legislator is acting as a candidate or a private citizen
and is not subject to the public forum doctrine at all. But to the ex116
tent that a public forum has been found to exist, as in Davison,
the identity of the government entity seems less material to a determination of viewpoint discriminatory behavior. Whether the entity responsible for hosting the meeting is a department or an individual is irrelevant to the silenced citizen, and the policy problems
raised by an alternative rule that distinguishes forums based on entity type are numerous. If the government can simply hold public
meetings in private venues with restrictive policies by ascribing the
event to a single official, what would stop the government from
conducting most of its public business in such a manner? While
proponents of the rule are sure to argue that such an outcome is
unlikely, the threat seems to undercut the very protections the First
Amendment affords.

112. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1823 (2014).
113. While not the subject of this Note, the application of public forum doctrine to government social media pages raises another important First Amendment question. Could the
Establishment Clause be interpreted as prohibiting government officials from tweeting bible
verses or otherwise expressing religious views? For an excellent summary of the issue, see
Eugene Volokh, Would Ruling Against Trump in Twitter User Blocking Lawsuit Also Bar Elected
Officials From Including Bible Verses in Their Political Twitter Accounts?, WASH. POST: VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY (Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/
wp/2017/08/25/would-ruling-against-trump-in-twitter-user-blocking-lawsuit-also-bar-electedofficials-from-including-bible-verses-in-their-political-twitter-accounts/?utm_term=
.8f314e9317fb.
114. While not the subject of this Note, the strengthening of open meeting laws with
clauses limiting acceptable venues might be an effective countermeasure.
115. See generally Davison v. Loudon Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 708
(E.D. Va. 2017) (walking through this analysis for an elected official), appeal docketed, Davison v. Randall, No. 17-2002 (4th Cir. Aug. 29, 2017).
116. Id. at 716. It’s worth noting that the identity of the government entity may well be
relevant for purposes of identifying whether a public forum exists. See supra notes 57–66 and
accompanying text.
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The state action doctrine is a logical shield to which the courts
might turn. The state action doctrine dictates that private parties
are incapable of violating the First Amendment, which proscribes
117
only government action. Therefore, as long as the private platform is the entity limiting speech, no First Amendment claim ex118
ists.
If we perceive the First Amendment violation as occurring when
the government opens a forum that will inherently and necessarily
be viewpoint discriminatory because of the platform’s terms of ser119
vice, then the government action requirement is satisfied. If, as
proponents of applying the public forum doctrine must argue,
there are situations in which ex post viewpoint discrimination by the
government is impermissible, then why should the same viewpoint
discrimination be acceptable ex ante? Furthermore, the fact that
almost all platforms rely on user reports to rapidly respond to
terms of service violations highlights another flaw in the state ac120
tion requirement argument. If, again, there are situations where
a government official violates an individual’s First Amendment
rights by blocking his speech directly ex post, the very same government official should not be able to achieve the same outcome by uti121
lizing the platform’s reporting feature. That these actions should
122
produce different doctrinal results defies common sense.
117. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, § 6.4.
118. See, e.g., Jacquelyn E. Fradette, Note, Online Terms of Service: A Shield for First Amendment Scrutiny of Government Action, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 947, 957 (2013).
119. While some might suggest that social media platforms in particular have such ‘public characteristics’ that the First Amendment might apply directly to them, courts have explicitly rejected this reasoning. See Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. America Online, Inc., 948 F.
Supp. 436, 451 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Such an argument would likely try to apply Marsh v. Alabama, a decision where the Court applied the First Amendment to activity on private property in a company town. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). For this argument, see Jonathan Peters, The “Sovereigns of Cyberspace” and State Action: The First Amendment’s Application – Or Lack Thereof – to
Third-Party Platforms, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 1015–24 (2017) (arguing that the time has
come for a new test “allow[ing] courts to compare public and private spaces more generally
to assess whether a private space is functionally public.”).
120. See supra notes 99–101 (outlining the policing processes used by the various platforms).
121. It is possible to imagine circumstances where a governmental body could argue that
private restraints on speech apply to what would otherwise qualify as a general-purpose public forum. Professor Leonard Niehoff offers the example of a local government entity that
needs to rent a space within the community that can hold 500 people for a specific meeting
at which issues of public importance will be discussed. Conversation with Leonard Niehoff,
Professor from Practice, Univ. Mich. Law Sch. (Apr. 6, 2018). It turns out that the only such
space in town is a church auditorium, and the church rental agreement provides that antireligious speech is not allowed on the premises. On one hand, Niehoff observes, the government might argue that it “can only rent what it can rent” and that the rental agreement
terms therefore allow it to impose a viewpoint-based restriction on the forum that would
otherwise be impermissible. Id. On the other hand, he points out, there is a difference between the church enforcing those terms (by asking someone who engages in such speech to
leave) and the government doing so (transforming the rental terms into state action). Id. In
any event, a Twitter account is easily distinguishable from this hypothetical. Twitter accounts
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Another potential policy problem looms: the retreat of government from social media. Even future caselaw holding that the public forum doctrine is only applicable when the government explicitly articulates that a social media page is meant for a government
purpose would pose significant problems for government entities.
As discussed earlier, one of the primary reasons government entities have established a presence online is to give citizens a way to
123
discuss their political beliefs. It is possible that some government
entities (emergency departments come to mind) might be able to
use language on their pages stating that the page exists solely to allow the public report emergencies or for the agency to provide
public service announcements, possibly taking them outside the
realm of the public forum doctrine. But for those government officials and agencies using social media more broadly, it is hard to
imagine a page that would not exist for the purpose of hearing public opinions. After all, the precise appeal of social media pages to
government entities is the opportunity they afford to engage with
constituents where they spend most of their time: on the plat124
forms. To the extent a page exists to solicit individual speech, a
125
ban on hate speech would be viewpoint discrimination. A Section
1983 or Bivens plaintiff could also argue that, even if a page purports to have a limited purpose, the page’s very existence on a plat126
form that allows for open feedback belies that purpose.
Neither would a holding that social media platforms are closed
public forums defeat the problem posed by the platforms’ terms of

generally do not exist for short periods to address exigent circumstances. And, as Niehoff’s
hypothetical helps demonstrate, it is one thing for Twitter to act based on its own conclusion that its terms of use have been violated and another thing for a state actor to make that
viewpoint-based judgment. See id.
122. Further lending credence to this conception of state action is the abundance of
situations in which indirect state action, for one reason or another, satisfies the requirement. See Kevin Park, Note, Facebook Used Takedown and it Was Super Effective! Finding a Framework for Protecting User Rights of Expression on Social Networking Sites, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 891, 916 (2013). But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503,
503–04 (1985) (“There . . . are no clear principles for determining whether state action exists.”).
123. See CONG. MGMT. FOUND., supra note 92.
124. See id.
125. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017).
126. It is worth noting that Facebook allows users to disable two-way communication.
Were a government official to utilize this feature in a robust manner, they could effectively
create a webpage that does little more than host statements and other content. See
FACEBOOK, supra note 99; see also Blocking People, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/
help/290450221052800 (last visited Nov. 5, 2018). While this might defeat any concerns
about public forum doctrine, not all platforms allow it, and it seems likely given the previously mentioned statistics that this is not the use government entities have in mind. See PEW
RESEARCH CTR., supra note 83.
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service. 127 Even in these most restricted of public forums, there are
128
limitations to censorship. Specifically, speech in closed public forums cannot be restricted by a desire to suppress certain view129
points. Again, Matal suggests that restrictions on hate speech are
viewpoint discriminatory and therefore in violation of the First
Amendment when utilized by the government. 130
B. . . . but it may not be able to stay there under the public forum doctrine.
Thus, even without Packingham and Davison, it is clear that if the
public forum doctrine is applied to government pages on social
media platforms, some of those pages will be found to be public forums. 131 Consequently, government entities may find their ability to
manage their social media presence constrained. What options do
they have in the face of this reality, then?
A total government withdrawal from social media is hard to
fathom. As previously noted, a large number of government enti132
ties have a presence on social media and many rely on it heavi133
ly. The total withdrawal of all government entities from social
media profiles would represent a sea change, at odds with the increasingly digital nature of American life. This would be an ironic
blow to the millions of Americans utilizing these platforms to fol134
low and communicate with their governments.
It is plausible that government entities might remove all social
media presence that suggests the creation of a public forum. The
government could limit its presence on social media platforms to
the public-safety related uses previously discussed, making it clear
that the pages exist solely to facilitate effective communication be-

127. And while not the subject of this Note, it seems unlikely that, having decided that
public forum doctrine applies to social media pages, courts would then find them to be
closed public forums. As previously mentioned, this is a category generally reserved for such
facilities as schools, military installations, and jails. See supra notes 15–32 and accompanying
text. While Justice Kennedy’s language in Packingham comparing social media to the town
square would seem to suggest a traditional forum, rulings that the pages constitute limited
public forums would also make sense. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
128. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
129. Id.
130. See Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1763.
131. Davison v. Loudon Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 716 (E.D. Va.
2017), appeal docketed, Davison v. Randall, No. 17-2002 (4th Cir. Aug. 29, 2017); see generally
Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (suggesting that these pages are
hosted in the modern equivalent of the town square).
132. See PUB. TECH. INST., supra note 10.
133. See, e.g., HOOTSUITE, supra note 93.
134. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 83.
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tween government and constituents during emergencies. 135 This
would still represent a significant retreat from the digital world at a
time when it has become a major component of daily life for many
136
Americans. This alternative would also impose significant costs
on government entities as they attempt to determine what type and
degree of presence they can maintain without creating a public forum. Asking the government to predict how courts will apply a
largely fact-driven balancing test to any given fact pattern is setting
them up for failure.
Government entities may respond by abandoning their social
media presence entirely, as the city of Redondo Beach did in the
137
face of similar concerns. Other cities may follow Seattle’s lead in
138
prohibiting officials from posting content related to city issues. A
2013 note by Ross Rinehart compellingly argues that the threatened application of the public forum doctrine to social media is
139
already chilling government uses of platforms.
PART III: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
We are at a crossroads. We run a risk that the public forum doctrine, designed to balance the right of the people to speak in public places with the need to maintain these forums, will instead lead
to the forums’ elimination altogether. Social media is important
140
and should be protected. However, we lack a doctrinal technique
for reconciling this value with our desire to let platform-owners set
rules to limit offensive uses of their platforms, which is expressed
in the state action doctrine. Put another way, government use of

135. For purposes of the hypothetical, this Note will assume that an effective doctrinal
filter could be created that would exclude the subject’s hate speech from the definition of
“emergencies.”
136. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., supra note 83 (highlighting the significant amount of time
many Americans spend on social media platforms every day).
137. Debra Cassens Weiss, California Town Abandons Facebook Page Amid Legal Concerns,
ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 24, 2010), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/california_town_
abandons_facebook_page_amid_legal_concerns (noting that the City Attorney was concerned about potential First Amendment violations).
138. Bill Sherman, Your Mayor, Your “Friend”: Public Officials, Social Networking, and the
Unmapped New Public Square, 31 PACE L. REV. 95, 106 (2011).
139. Rinehart, supra note 95, at 785. Rinehart’s note offers a glimpse at what may come
in the wake of more decisions acknowledging the possibility that government social media
pages are public forums. Even if the government does not abandon social media entirely,
the opportunity to engage with citizens may be limited significantly. Rinehart also argues
that the removal of this venue for speech will “contravene citizens’ trust” in their government. Id. at 832. Rinehart cites Pew research indicating that most Americans “believe that
the Internet has had a major impact on the ability of groups to impact society at large.” Id.
140. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732 (2017).
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privately-owned social media presents both practical and conceptual First Amendment problems.
Part III examines potential solutions that maintain the public forum doctrine’s current framework. These solutions include a government-operated platform, legislated restrictions on hate speech,
and a redefinition of the undesirable speech. This analysis ultimately concludes, however, that these solutions are either impractical, facially unconstitutional, or underinclusive of problematic
speech. Instead, Part III identifies a simple test as the best path
forward into the digital age. This approach represents a return to
the roots of the public forum doctrine: an “apprais[al of] the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the [speech] regu141
lation” in the context in which the regulation occurred.
First, let’s examine some possibilities that maintain the doctrinal
status quo. If the need to protect private rights is eliminated, then
protection for speech can be enshrined. A dedicated, publiclyowned social media platform would solve the doctrinal problems
presented by the application of the public forum doctrine to social
media. Since a government entity would be operating the platform, there could be no argument that ex ante viewpoint discriminatory restrictions were private acts that failed to satisfy the state
142
action requirement.
The government-operated platform works conceptually because
it removes the wrinkle caused by private ownership of a conduit for
government engagement with the public. The public forum doctrine envisions, unsurprisingly, government-owned, -operated,
143
and/or -sponsored forums. It assumes that the state action requirement will screen out claims arising from private action. By
removing the question of whether a platform-wide restriction constitutes government action, a government-operated social platform
would lend itself to a more traditional application of the public forum doctrine.
And from a doctrinal standpoint, there is a lot to like about this
government-operated platform approach. If government entities
limited themselves to one platform or a few platforms that were
similar in set-up, early litigation could identify factors delineating

141. Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939). See Carl E. Brody Jr., Considering the
Public Forum Status of Government Internet Sites, 44 STETSON L. REV. 389, 393 (2015) (explaining that this is “the root of our public forum analysis.”).
142. It is hard to imagine what government entity would be responsible for maintaining
the platform. The task would be too great for most local entities. Would they instead rely on
a Federal or State platform? This cross-government platform might complicate matters.
143. See supra notes 15–32 and accompanying text.
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types of forums. 144 Government officials and agencies could take
cues from the courts and create pages with a reasonable sense of
how the First Amendment would apply. This would then allow offi145
cials to make informed decisions about how to use the platform.
Officials would also have a clear sense of what limitations could be
imposed ex ante. Litigation could similarly make clear what sort of
platform-wide content rules would be constitutional.
But a government platform approach is impractical and unlikely
to be implemented. The task seems monumental and would likely
be controversial. The federal government is not known for its effi146
ciency and effectiveness as an operator of widely-used websites.
And many state and local governments might find the cost of creat147
ing and operating their own platforms hard to bear, forcing
them to rely on a federal platform over which they would have lit148
tle control.
Still more problematic is the reality that such a platform would
likely be unappealing to government officials and agencies because
it would struggle to attract the public. As discussed earlier, government presence on privately-owned social media platforms is

144. These determinations can focus on very specific fact patterns. See, e.g., Members of
City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (finding that utility poles on public property were nonpublic forums).
145. Cf. Kristy Dalton, Why Most Government Social Media Policies Suck, GOV. TECH.:
GOVGIRL (2017), http://www.govtech.com/govgirl/Why-Most-Government-Social-MediaPolicies-Suck.html (observing that “[t]he reality is that there is very little case law to guide us
in the area of government social media policies.”).
146. Amy Goldstein, HHS Failed to Heed Many Warnings That HealthCare.gov Was in Trouble, WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/hhs-failed-to-heed-many-warnings-that-healthcaregov-was-in-trouble/2016/02/22/
dd344e7c-d67e-11e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html?utm_term=.ec9173bd5597 (chronicling
the Federal government’s lengthy misadventures in trying to roll out a website to serve those
seeking healthcare following the passage of the Affordable Care Act).
147. By way of illustration: Ann Arbor, Michigan’s FY 2018 budget noted a little more
than $15.3 million in unassigned general funds for the year, a rosy fiscal picture. CITY OF
ANN ARBOR, FY 2018 ADOPTED BUDGET 37 (2018), https://www.a2gov.org/
departments/finance-admin-services/accounting/Documents/FY18%20Adopted%20
Budget%20Book%20-6.20.17%20FINAL.pdf. Facebook, as of June, 30, 2018, had 30,275
employees. Stats, FACEBOOK, https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Oct. 26,
2018). Its total costs and expenses for FY 2017 were reported as $20.45 billion. Facebook,
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 34 (Feb. 1, 2018), http://d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.
net/CIK-0001326801/c826def3-c1dc-47b9-99d9-76c89d6f8e6d.pdf. Obviously not every town
needs to create a platform the size of Facebook. Nonetheless, this is a significant undertaking.
148. For just one example of difficulties getting Federal resources on the same page as
municipal, state, and regional needs, see the history of the Gateway tunnel project. Despite
wide understanding that major upgrades to the train tunnels under the Hudson River are
long overdue, and that the current situation poses a real threat of catastrophic failure, the
project, announced in 2011, is just now getting funded. See Patrick McGeehan, Spending Deal
May Breathe New Life Into Gateway Rail Tunnel Project, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://
nyti.ms/2FPwFGe.
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largely a response to the public’s preferences. 149 Where Americans
go, their governments will follow. The start-up costs involved in
drawing the public to a social media platform are significant; many
150
platforms fail due to a lack of interest. Government entities may
151
well struggle to attract users to a government-only platform. Plat152
forms that have ‘made it’ have done so by being hip. What could
153
possibly be less hip than a government social media site? And
even if some erstwhile letter writers move to the platform, others
154
may still be deterred by a perceived lack of privacy.
At the other end of the spectrum, government entities could
conceivably avoid offending the First Amendment by withdrawing
altogether from social media. But this is unappealing for practical
155
reasons. As noted earlier, Americans live on social media and
156
they enjoy interacting with their elected officials in this space.
Simply put, we want government on social media.
What middle ground can be found between protecting speech
on social media and maintaining its viability as a conduit for government activity? Some might suggest that privately-held platforms
should not be in the business of regulating speech in the first place
and that this job is better left to the federal legislature. The theory
that risk of oppression of minority voices decreases as a democratic
157
constituency increases in size predates the Constitution. This
concept resonates in modern-day opinions authored by Justices
158
across the ideological spectrum, from Stevens to Scalia. Perhaps
149. See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
150. See Amelia Tait, Mastodon.Social: Why Does Every New “Twitter” Fail?, NEW STATESMAN
(Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.newstatesman.com/science-tech/social-media/2017/04/
mastodonsocial-why-does-every-new-twitter-fail.
151. See Fang Wang, Explaining the Low Utilization of Government Websites: Using a Grounded
Theory Approach, 31 GOV’T INFO. Q. 610, 610, 619 (2014) (documenting low usage of official
government websites worldwide, even as internet use expands, and suggesting, presciently,
investigation of social media platforms as a remedy).
152. See Tait, supra note 150.
153. See 6. Perceptions of Elected Officials and the Role of Money in Politics, PEW RESEARCH CTR.
(Nov. 23, 2015), http://www.people-press.org/2015/11/23/6-perceptions-of-electedofficials-and-the-role-of-money-in-politics/([L]arge majorities of the public view elected officials as out of touch . . . .”); see also Josh Butler, Is this the Most Awkward Government Recruitment Ad Ever?, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 1, 2017, 10:03 AM), https://www.huffington
post.com.au/2017/02/28/is-this-the-most-awkward-government-recruitment-ad-ever_a_
21862845/ (offering a typical reaction to government outreach efforts).
154. See Tiffany Hsu, For Many Facebook Users, a ‘Last Straw’ that Led Them to Quit, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2FXZdJS (recounting a wave of backlash and exodus from the Facebook platform after reports that a third-party political firm working on
behalf of President Trump was able to access private data about platform users).
155. See supra notes 83–84 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
157. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
158. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 251 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison)); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 523 (1989 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting same section of THE
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some speech regulation by a large enough constituency might not
be as worrisome as it would seem at first blush.
From a practical perspective, this approach appears workable.
Gone is our concern about relying on private entities to police
public speech, as government would take direct responsibility for
the job. Speakers, platform owners, and courts will all have clear
direction as to what restrictions are permissible. Legislators will be
able to take into consideration their usage needs when drafting
legislation and will be able to clarify the rules should courts run
afoul of their intent. There is also some conceptual appeal to this
approach. After all, the legislature is the vessel through which the
159
people maintain their sovereignty. If the legislature is the voice
of the people, a strong argument can be made that it is best positioned to make decisions about appropriate regulation for the digi160
tal world. The legislature is responsible for making laws, after
161
all.
But doctrinally, legislative regulation of hate speech on social
media is dead in the water. The amendment states, “Congress shall
162
make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.” And as previously discussed, recent caselaw makes it clear that prohibitions on
hate speech are viewpoint discriminatory, which the First Amend163
ment cannot tolerate. So how can we enable the legislature to
regulate the harm we think it should prevent without running
afoul of the First Amendment? To answer this question, we must
understand what it is we are trying to prevent. As previously discussed, the problematic speech that seems to raise the most obvi164
ous constitutional concern is hate speech.
Black’s Law Dictionary defines hate speech as “[s]peech that
carries no meaning other than the expression of hatred for some
group, such as a particular race, especially in circumstances in
165
which the communication is likely to provoke violence.” Justice
Alito’s opinion in Matal seems to define protected hate speech as

FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison)). While Croson and Adarand are 14th Amendment cases, the prevalence of Madison’s logic in the justices’ thinking is clear.
159. See Enrique Schaerer, Justice Scalia and the Proper Role of a Judge, FEDERALIST SOC.
(Mar. 7, 2016), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/blog-posts/justice-scalia-and-the-properrole-of-a-judge (laying out Justice Scalia’s view on the roles of the branches).
160. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 2.143 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
161. Cf. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
162. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
163. See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1763 (2017).
164. See Part II.B supra.
165. Hate Speech, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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“[s]peech that demeans on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, re166
ligion, age, disability, or any other similar ground. . . .”
These definitions leave some wiggle room, particularly as it pertains to speech with the potential to threaten or incite violence.
167
Justice Alito’s opinion makes no mention of such speech. Black’s
Law Dictionary seems to suggest that speech inciting violence is
168
“[especially]” hateful. Unsurprisingly, speech that may incite or
threaten violence (let’s call it ‘dangerous speech’) is of particular
169
concern to the proprietors of social media platforms. It is also a
170
category targeted by many platforms’ policies.
Crucially, the First Amendment protects neither speech that is
likely to incite violence or true threats. While the Supreme Court’s
171
jurisprudence has grown steadily more protective of speech, even
the narrow test set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio denies protection to
speech that “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
172
action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” The Court
has also held that “true” threats are not protected by the First
173
Amendment. There is play in both of these standards. What is
‘likely’ to incite lawless action is not a static concept. As for what
constitutes a “true” threat, the circuits have split about the appro174
priate standard to apply.
This suggests that narrowed restrictions might not offend the
First Amendment, even if the public forum doctrine is applied.
Perhaps government entities could contract with platforms and
reach specific agreements to prohibit only speech which is left unprotected by Brandenburg and Watts. Platforms might be willing to
change their policies to avoid losing some of their highest-profile
175
pages or users. Perhaps the state or federal government could try
to pass laws banning violent speech on the internet, though these
statutes would have to be carefully constructed to avoid being
found unconstitutionally vague.

166. Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1765.
167. Id.
168. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 165.
169. See Update on the Global Internet Forum to Counter Terrorism, FACEBOOK (Dec. 4, 2017),
https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/12/update-on-the-global-internet-forum-to-counterterrorism/ (reiterating Facebook’s commitment to curbing the effects of violent speech).
170. See supra notes 99–101.
171. See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017).
172. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
173. See Watts v. U.S., 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
174. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 80, § 11.3.2.
175. See Aric Jenkins, Facebook Just Revealed 3 Major Changes to its Privacy Settings, TIME
(Mar. 28, 2018, 8:09 AM), http://time.com/5218395/facebook-privacy-settings-changescambridge-analytica/ (outlining changes made by Facebook to stop an exodus of users following revelations of improper access to user data by a political firm employed by the
Trump campaign).
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Similar work may be done by the fighting words doctrine. 176 In
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, the Court made it clear that ‘fighting
words,’ “those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace[,]” are not protected by
177
the First Amendment.
But while these solutions make a lot of sense (perhaps even independent of the problems raised by this Note), they remain in178
complete. Platforms may have very good reasons for wanting to
ban non-dangerous speech. Perhaps they fear boycotts by offended
users. Perhaps certain views simply are not in line with ownership’s
ideology. Making sure that platforms can remove violent speech is
important, but it hardly seems like an adequate answer to the larger issue.
Another possibility is to shield government pages on private social media platforms from scrutiny under the public forum doctrine. This would require judicial acknowledgment of the limitations of the doctrine. The cases could perhaps be distinguished by
citing the informal nature of the forum or by noting that the for179
mat of the platforms changes quickly. A carve out of this kind
acknowledges the importance of maintaining social media as a forum for communication between the government and the public
and prevents an outcome that might induce the government to
withdraw from the field altogether. From a practical standpoint,
this seems to work.
But how dissatisfying! This approach saves social media as a forum for individuals to speak to their government by granting their
government limitless power to constrain their speech. And a significant portion of the public clearly expects some protection for
180
speech online.

176. See Shikha Parikh, Your Right to Speak on Government Sponsored Social Media Sites, 50
MD. B.J. 14, 18 (2017).
177. 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
178. And the potential effectiveness of the fighting words doctrine in this context may
be limited. Some courts have restricted the doctrine’s application to face-to-face interactions. See, e.g., State v. Dugan, 303 P.3d 755, 767 (Mont. 2013) (finding that the doctrine has
a face-to-face requirement that was not satisfied by a phone conversation in which the defendant called another individual a “f——— c—-.”); see also State v. Drahota, 788 N.W.2d
796, 802, 804 (Neb. 2010) (refusing to apply the doctrine to e-mails sent to a professor and
political candidate accusing him of being an Al-Qaida sympathizer because the target “could
not have immediately retaliated” and the inflict-injury prong of the doctrine cannot support
the criminalization of speech “solely because it inflicts emotional injury.”).
179. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text.
180. See Shine Cho, State of the First Amendment? Many Americans Say it Shouldn’t Protect Divisive Campus Speakers, Hate Speech on Social Media, STUDENT PRESS LAW CTR. (June 30, 2017,
2:28 PM), http://www.splc.org/article/2017/06/newseum-first-amendment-2017-survey.
While a narrow majority of respondents said that the First Amendment should not protect
hate speech on social media, the results suggest considerable dispute.

FALL 2018]

You Can’t Say That!

261

Still, criticism of the public forum doctrine and its current in181
flexible form is widespread. Criticism is not limited to the doc182
trine’s application to the digital space, with the rigidity of the
183
categorical approach coming under fire as label-driven. Courts
184
have struggled to distinguish between categories, despite much
riding on the outcomes of their decisions. Recent criticism has singled out the consequences of the doctrine’s inflexibility in applica185
tions to the digital space.
Perhaps then what is needed, at least in the digital context, is a
simplification that remains true to the underlying principles of the
doctrine while providing much-needed flexibility to deal with the
186
particulars of a given situation. Scholars have advocated for such
187
an approach for decades. This would finally restore to prominence a principle, present throughout early public forum jurisprudence, that has been obscured in recent years. The point of the
public forum doctrine is to weigh our desire to protect public
speech against the need of the government to function. As the
Court explained in Grayned v. City of Rockford: “[t]he crucial ques-

181. See e.g., Brody Jr., supra note 141, at 391 (“Unfortunately, certain . . . attempts to
define the field [of public forum doctrine] have broadened the scope of public forum analysis and created confusion as to its proper application.”).
182. See, e.g., U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 741 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“I have
questioned whether public forum analysis, as the Court has employed it in recent cases,
serves to obfuscate rather than clarify the issues at hand.”).
183. See, e.g., C. Thomas Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 109, 110 (1987) (positing that the doctrine yields “an
inadequate jurisprudence of labels” where “[l]egal outcomes depend . . . on what pigeonhole of law is determined to apply.”); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 46, 93 (1987) (“Existing doctrine, with its myopic focus on formalistic labels,
serves only to distract attention from the real stakes in these disputes.”). The doctrine also
struggles with other types of digital ex ante speech controls. See Enrique Armijo, Kill Switches,
Forum Doctrine, and the First Amendment’s Digital Future, 32 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 411, 433
(2014) (arguing that the doctrine “leaves courts ill-equipped to deal with ex ante speech controls over digital communications.”).
184. See Marc Rohr, The Ongoing Mystery of the Limited Public Forum, 33 NOVA L. REV. 299,
300 (2009) (“Substantial confusion exists regarding what distinction, if any, exists between a
‘designated public forum’ and a ‘limited public forum.’”); see, e.g., Justice For All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 765 n.6 (5th Cir. 2005) (noting that the “precise taxonomic designation
of the [limited public forum] remains elusive.”).
185. See, e.g., David S. Ardia, Government Speech and Online Forums: First Amendment Limitations on Moderating Public Discourse, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1981, 1982 (2010) (arguing that the
doctrine’s “formalistic categories and arcane rules” limits “judicial . . . flexibility in dealing
with” online speech).
186. Members of the Supreme Court have been noting the need for such flexibility for
some time. See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 859–60 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting
that “the notion of ‘public forum’ has never been the touchstone of public expression” and
calling for “a flexible approach to determining when public expression should be protected.”).
187. See, e.g., Stone, supra note 183, at 93 (“Whether the first amendment guarantees
individuals a right to engage in expressive activities on public property should turn . . . on a
reasonable accommodation of the competing speech and governmental interests.”).
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tion is whether the manner of expression is basically incompatible
188
with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.”
Distilling the doctrine down to this basic question of compatibility yields results that seem to work rather well for social media.
189
‘Mean words,’ such as the ones posted by the plaintiff in Davison,
would likely be protected. As many readers of this Note are no
doubt aware, social media can be very rough and tumble. 190 While
this may be viewed as a downside, general name-calling is not in191
compatible with the forum. This is a good thing normatively: our
sense that letting officials screen out mean words is wrong brought
192
us here in the first place. But while we also aim to protect un193
popular opinions, we do not protect them when they are incompatible with the normal usage of forum in which they are ex194
Here, protecting hate speech and other types of
pressed.
protected speech banned by platforms would be incompatible with
195
their continued use as a forum by the government. And so, the
government does not run afoul of this simplified version of the
doctrine by creating a page where users must adhere to the platform’s rules.
Put another way, applying the simplified public forum doctrine
to this fact pattern yields two principles: (1) individual, nongovernment persons are constitutionally entitled to interact with
government social media pages as long as they stay within the
bounds of “normal usage” of the platform; and (2) government actors on social media may (indirectly, at least) constrain what would
otherwise be constitutionally protected speech as long as the constraint is necessary to maintain their presence on the platform.

188. 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
189. See Davison v. Loudon Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 267 F. Supp. 3d 702, 711 (E.D. Va.
2017), appeal docketed, Davison v. Randall, No. 17-2002 (4th Cir. Aug. 29, 2017).
190. See Maeve Duggan, Online Harassment 2017, PEW RESEARCH CTR.: INTERNET & TECH.,
(July 11, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/2017/07/11/online-harassment-2017/ (offering statistics on internet users encounters with harassment and unkind words).
191. See notes 99–101 supra (laying out the rules for the various platforms).
192. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
193. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 117 (noting our inability to restrict “unpopular viewpoints”
out of “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint.” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
509 (1969))).
194. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 118 (clarifying that activity which materially disrupts the
forum, in that case a classroom, may be forbidden).
195. This conclusion, of course, assumes that the private platforms are not state actors
also subject to the constraints of the First Amendment. See Part II supra. While some have
argued that this should not be the case, most acknowledge that it is the current state of the
law. See e.g., Peters, supra note 119, at 1015–24 (concluding that under the current doctrine
“Facebook could not be described as a state actor,” but also that the time has come for a new
test “allow[ing] courts to compare public and private spaces more generally to assess whether a private space is functionally public.”).
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The proposed solution will not end debate. It interprets “normal
usage” to mean “usage that is not prohibited usage.” An argument
could certainly be made that ‘normal’ means something narrower
than that: perhaps usage consistent with some normative interpretation of what is appropriate for the forum. This is a reasonable interpretation, but one that would yield a rule both difficult to administer and at odds with the notion that speech should not be
196
prohibited merely because it is offensive.
The solution also allows for the possibility that the government
might limit its presence online to a privately-owned platform with
restrictive terms of use that limit speech significantly—achieving
the very end-run around speech protections that we aim to avoid.
While the worst of these scenarios—a situation where the platform’s terms of use are tailored to the governments preferences—
might be interpreted by viewing the platform as a state actor per197
forming state functions, it is easy to imagine situations where social media platforms, while truly independent, have uncomfortably
198
narrow use restrictions. The proposed new digital public doctrine admittedly encompasses a normative judgment that allowing
such a possibility is an acceptable cost of maintaining government
presence on social media.
It is unclear how the courts will decide to deal with the public
forum doctrine in the digital context. However, it seems likely that
any decision will be in part the result of a balancing act where our
desire to limit the harmful effects of dangerous speech is weighed
against our respect for the protections enshrined in the Constitution. Given the importance of popular interaction with the government to our society, we can ill afford missteps.
CONCLUSION
Our Founding Fathers enshrined the protection of speech in
the Bill of Rights; our fondness for ‘Free Speech’ has resulted in
196. See Grayned, 408 U.S. at 117 (noting our inability to restrict “unpopular viewpoints”
out of “mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint.” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
509 (1969))).
197. The state-actor test currently in use asks the court to examine “(1) ‘the extent to
which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits’; (2) ‘whether the actor is
performing a traditional governmental function’; and (3) ‘whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of governmental authority.’” See Georgia v.
McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 51 (1992) (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S.
614, 621–22 (1991)).
198. A platform with a ban on ‘mean words’ is a plausible example. Many thanks to Paul
Hoversten for developing the notion of this hypothetical platform, which he would name
“Snowflake.”
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jurisprudence creating heightened protections for it. Still, the digital revolution has carried us into a new age. In many ways, the average citizen is capable of speaking like never before: her ‘voice’
transiting the globe online, reaching people she has never heard
of and will never meet. These newfound powers are heady and we
have seen them used both for good and for evil. We are at a crossroads and we must evaluate the meaning of ‘Free Speech’ in this
digital context. What should be protected and in what forum? I
submit that building consensus around the answer we do reach will
be just as important as the answer itself.

